Faith, Pluralism, and the Practice of Law by Robert K. Vischer
The Catholic Lawyer 
Volume 43 
Number 1 Volume 43, Spring 2004, Number 1 Article 3 
November 2017 
Faith, Pluralism, and the Practice of Law 
Robert K. Vischer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl 
 Part of the Catholic Studies Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert K. Vischer (2004) "Faith, Pluralism, and the Practice of Law," The Catholic Lawyer: Vol. 43 : No. 1 , 
Article 3. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl/vol43/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
FAITH, PLURALISM, AND THE PRACTICE
OF LAW
ROBERT K. VISCHER*
Religious lawyers grappling with the dictates of their faith
in the context of their professional lives often seem to face an
unenviable predicament: in effect facing a choice between amoral
relativism and illiberal paternalism. To the extent that they
subvert their own moral compasses to the professional paradigm
embodied in the governing regulatory regime, they must
artificially constrain the all-encompassing explanatory and
prescriptive power of their faith traditions. But if they allow the
tenets of their faith to dictate their provision of legal services,
they threaten to turn the client-centered tradition of the
profession upside-down.
Both the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility and the
Model Code of Professional Conduct focus on the maximization of
client autonomy, thereby presuming that the lawyer's own moral
convictions are of limited relevance to the lawyer's work. For
example, a religious lawyer working to structure a deal through
which her corporate client plans to acquire a smaller company
and terminate its low-level employees without any severance pay
or reemployment assistance will most likely feel significant
pressure to separate her own moral misgivings from her work in
light of the Model Rules' suggestion that legal representation
"does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political,
economic, social or moral views or activities"1  and the
accompanying explanation that "lawyers usually defer to the
client regarding such questions as... concern for third persons
who might be adversely affected" by the representation. 2 Such
an approach tends toward an ethical positivism, implicitly giving
* Assistant Professor, St. John's University School of Law. Thanks to Rick Garnett,
Paul Kirgis, Michael Simons, and Susan Stabile for comments on earlier drafts of
this essay.
I MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2003).
2 Id. at cmt. 2.
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sanction to any client-chosen means or ends that are not
affirmatively proscribed by the profession, which in turn leads
even the most well-intentioned lawyers of faith to adopt
relativist stances on moral questions that arise in their
representation of clients.
On the other hand, to the extent that religious lawyers
subvert their conduct as a lawyer to their religious beliefs, they
seem to sacrifice the core function that lawyers serve in a liberal
democracy: pursuing others' conception of the good within the
boundaries constructed by the law, not within the boundaries
constructed by the individual lawyer's own religiously based
conception of the good. It is neither practicable nor
democratically desirable3 for a religious lawyer to ensure, for
example, that her corporate client's policies and priorities
comport fully with her faith tradition's teachings on social
justice. 4 Understandably reluctant to jettison the client-directed,
gatekeeping quality of legal services, religious lawyers tend to
limit, consciously or not, the impact of their faith, effectively
segmenting their professional and personal identities.
This conundrum is by no means subject to tidy resolution,
but it is prone to a more optimistic reframing in light of recent
teaching from the Catholic Church that addresses the tension
between the religious and political spheres. Specifically, the
Church's Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith ("CDF")5 has
issued a Doctrinal Note laying out an explication of the moral
obligations that accompany a lay Catholic's participation in the
political processes of the secular state.6 Obviously, the analysis
is most directly relevant to the life of a Catholic lawyer, but it
3 When a lawyer invokes her own vision of the good to foreclose her client from
employing tactics or pursuing objectives that are legal, the argument goes, she has
effectively usurped the function of the democratically accountable actors who
established the legality of those tactics and objectives.
4 And more broadly, of course, if a client's behavior or objectives correlated
perfectly with the standards espoused by religion, often there would be little need
for legal representation in the first place.
5 In Pope John Paul II's words, the CDF's duty " 'is to promote and safeguard
the doctrine on the faith and morals throughout the Catholic world."' Congregation
for the Doctrine of the Faith, at http://www.vatican.valroman-curia/congregations/cf
aith/documents/rccon.cfaithpr_14071997_en.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2004).
6 Doctrinal Note on Some Questions Regarding the Participation of Catholics in
Political Life, at http://www.vatican.va/roman curia/congregations/cfaith/documents
/rcconcfaithdoc_20021124_politica-en.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2004)
[hereinafter Doctrinal Note].
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also holds value for any lawyer of faith concerned with the
interplay--or lack thereof-between their professional and
religious identities.
Lawyers share a fundamental trait with politicians: They
both are charged under the liberal project with pursuing
conceptions of the good that generally are formulated, expressed,
and desired by others. As such, the CDF speaks directly to the
predicament sketched above, and its key insight is centered in
the espousal of what amounts to a limited value pluralism,
which flows from its recognition of the fundamental distinction
between the role of religious truth and moral truth in the
decision-making of public actors- politicians and lawyers alike.
A brief synopsis of the CDF's observations and conclusions bears
out these lessons.
At the outset, the CDF unequivocally rejects the type of
ethical relativism that, under the guise of serving client
autonomy, often appears to hold sway in the legal profession.
Observing the nature of liberal political discourse, the CDF notes
that:
Citizens claim complete autonomy with regard to their moral
choices, and lawmakers maintain that they are respecting this
freedom of choice by enacting laws, which ignore the principles
of natural ethics and yield to ephemeral cultural and moral
trends, as if every possible outlook on life were of equal value. 7
This relativism cuts an even broader swath because:
At the same time, the value of tolerance is disingenuously
invoked when a large number of citizens, Catholics among
them, are asked not to base their contribution to society and
political life-through the legitimate means available to
everyone in a democracy-on their particular understanding of
the human person and the common good.8
Nevertheless, Catholics and other like-minded citizens must
contest the "falsehood of relativism, and with it, the notion that
there is no moral law rooted in the nature of the human
person."9
Discerning the content of this moral law must begin by
recognizing that it is not a freestanding or random collection of
prohibitions, but a comprehensive worldview that emanates from
7 Id. 2.
8 Id.
9 Id.
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"a correct understanding of the human person."10 Catholics.
acting in the political sphere cannot compromise their
understanding of the person, "for otherwise the witness of the
Christian faith in the world, as well as the unity and interior
coherence of the faithful, would be non-existent."'" As such,
Catholic lawyers, even when entering into the secular sphere of
law, are bound by certain "fundamental and inalienable ethical
demands,"'12 including demands to "defend the basic right to life
from conception to natural death;" to safeguard and promote the
family "in the face of modern laws on divorce;" to ensure "the
freedom of parents regarding the education of their children;" to
protect minors and combat "modern forms of slavery" such as
"drug abuse and prostitution;" to fight for "religious freedom and
the development of an economy that is at the service of the
human person and of the common good;" to help implement the
principles of solidarity and subsidiarity; and to pursue peace,
which "demands the absolute and radical rejection of violence
and terrorism.' 13
Certainly the import of these demands will not always be
clear-cut in particular real-world scenarios, and many
contrasting subordinate values are within the orbit of a dignity-
based ethic. The CDF acknowledges as much, noting, "a
plurality of methodologies reflective of different sensibilities and
cultures can be legitimate in approaching such questions."14 The
significant limitation is that "no Catholic can appeal to the
principle of pluralism or to the autonomy of lay involvement in
political life to support policies affecting the common good which
compromise or undermine" such demands.15 In other words, the
Catholic lawyer cannot avoid her responsibility to meet these
demands simply by invoking a mantle of autonomy whenever she
steps into the professional sphere.
This rejection of ethical relativism facilitates the personal
integrity of the ethical actor. The CDF's analysis consequently
precludes the acceptability of the segmented life, emphasizing
that an individual cognizant of absolute truth must integrate
10 Id. 3 (emphasis in original).
11 Id.
12 Id. 4 (emphasis in original).
13 Id. (emphasis in original).
14 Id. 5.
15 Id.
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that truth in a manner that brings coherence, not dissonance, to
every aspect of their existence:
It is a question of the lay Catholic's duty to be morally coherent,
found within one's conscience, which is one and
indivisible. "There cannot be two parallel lives in their
existence: on the one hand, the so-called 'spiritual life', with its
values and demands; and on the other, the so-called 'secular'
life, that is, life in a family, at work, in social responsibilities, in
the responsibilities of public life and in culture. The branch,
engrafted to the vine, which is Christ, bears its fruit in every
sphere of existence and activity. In fact, every area of the lay
faithful's lives, as different as they are, enters into the plan of
God, who desires that these very areas be the 'places in time'
where the love of Christ is revealed and realized for both the
glory of the Father and service of others. Every activity, every
situation, every precise responsibility-as, for example, skill
and solidarity in work, love and dedication in the family and
the education of children, service to society and public life and
the promotion of truth in the area of culture-are the occasions
ordained by providence for a 'continuous exercise of faith, hope
and charity.' "16
Acknowledging the moral law's ethical demands is a
prerequisite not only for the Christian lawyer's personal
integrity but also for her role in the evangelical impetus that in
large part defines the faith. The CDF reminds Catholics that
"[t]he presentation of the fruits of the spiritual, intellectual and
moral heritage of Catholicism in terms understandable to
modern culture is a task of great urgency today."17 Through its
teaching, the CDF intends "to instruct and illuminate the
consciences of the faithful, particularly those involved in political
life, so that their actions may always serve the integral
promotion of the human person and the common good."' 8
Crucially, in the CDF's view, the non-negotiability of these
ethical demands does not represent the illegitimate intrusion of
religious dogma into the secular domain. Emphasizing that
"such ethical precepts are rooted in human nature itself and
belong to the natural moral law," the CDF explains that "[t]hey
do not require from those who defend them the profession of the
16 Id. 4 (quoting Apostolicam actuositatem, 4).
17 Id. 7.
18 Id. 6.
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Christian faith."19 This is a necessary characteristic given "the
rightful autonomy of the political or civil sphere from that of
religion and the Church-but not from that of morality."20 The
need to safeguard religious liberty and other individual rights
leads the CDF to emphasize the proper boundaries between the
spheres: "The recognition of civil and political rights, as well as
the allocation of public services may not be made dependent
upon citizens' religious convictions or activities."21 The moral
precepts binding on the Catholic lawyer in all aspects of her
identity are not coextensive with the tenets of her faith, and she
need not feel compelled to mirror every nuance of her own
religious beliefs in the means or ends chosen by her client.
Even in practice areas impacted by the content of the moral
law, the CDF recognizes a variety of ways in which the Catholic
lawyer's ethical obligations can be acknowledged. The dignity of
the human person cannot be disregarded, notwithstanding the
wishes of the client or the import of the client's cause; however,
there are many paths by which that dignity may be upheld. The
CDF is careful to distinguish relativism from "the legitimate
freedom of Catholic citizens to choose among the various political
opinions that are compatible with faith and the natural moral
law, and to select, according to their own criteria, what best
corresponds to the needs of the common good."22 While not every
conception of the good is equally valid and true, "a plurality of
morally acceptable policies and solutions arises" from the fact
that "politics are concerned with very concrete realizations of the
true human and social good in given historical, geographic,
economic, technological and cultural contexts."23 As a result, "[i]t
is not the Church's task to set forth specific political
solutions-and even less to propose a single solution as the
acceptable one-to temporal questions that God has left to the
free and responsible judgment of each person."24
In this sense, the CDF espouses a distinctly pluralist
approach to the integration of faith and legal practice. There is
no pluralism "in the choice of moral principles or essential
19 Id. 5.
20 Id. 6.
21 Id.
22 Id. 3.
23 Id.
24 Id.
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values," but there is a "legitimate plurality of temporal options"
given the "variety of strategies available for accomplishing or
guaranteeing the same fundamental value, the possibility of
different interpretations of the basic principles of political
theory, and the technical complexity of many political
problems." 25 There is also, of course, a plurality of religious
values in the political sphere, a plurality safeguarded by the
inalienable moral right to religious liberty and freedom of
conscience. This aspect of pluralism does not slide into
relativism because it "is based on the ontological dignity of the
human person and not on a non-existent equality among
religions or cultural systems of human creation."26
With these observations, the CDF, consistent with
longstanding Catholic teaching, has carved out an alternative to
the alienating extremes of the morally segmented life and the
agency-squelching dictates of a one-size-fits-all approach to
ethical decision-making. For the Catholic lawyer, this makes the
practice of law possible. The Catholic lawyer does not have to
pretend that her deeply held beliefs speak only to the non-
professional aspects of her existence. In terms that Camus used
to explain the feeling of absurdity, such segmentation constitutes
a "divorce between man and his life, the actor and his setting,"
creating an existence in which "man feels an alien, a stranger."27
At the same time, the vision illuminated by the CDF allows
the Catholic lawyer to function as a lawyer in a liberal
democracy by justifying her deference to the rightful
preeminence of the client. Where the client's objectives implicate
values that diverge from the lawyer's own religion-based values,
but do not contradict the fundamental dignity of the human
person embodied in the moral law, affording autonomy to the
client is appropriate, 28 as is the secular state's autonomy from
faith communities' claims of religious truth. Such deference is
necessarily limited only where the client proposes a course of
25 Id.
26 Id. 8.
27 ALBERT CAMUS, An Absurd Reasoning, in THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS AND
OTHER ESSAYS 5 (1995).
28 This contention is not to deny the lawyer's proper role in helping shape the
client's objectives through constructive, often value-laden dialogue. See Robert K.
Vischer, Catholic Social Thought and the Ethical Formation of Lawyers: A Call for
Community, 1 VILL. J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT _ (forthcoming 2004).
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conduct that clashes with the moral law's conception of the
human person.
While this fundamental moral conception of the human
person that is to be furthered by every Catholic's vocation
remains fixed and unchanging, there is a vast universe of
subordinate and widely varying values that constitute the daily
effort to fulfill that vocation. For lawyers especially, the values
to be served in their professional capacities will not always
correlate perfectly with the values they seek to serve in their
personal capacities. Both sets of values must, however, be
consistent with the recognized dignity of the human person.
A few examples bear out the potential scope of this core
consistency. A Catholic lawyer asked to defend an accused
murderer against overwhelming evidence of guilt may very well
decide to take on the representation in service to the notions of
human dignity embodied in the individual procedural protections
offered by our criminal justice system. But such systemic
considerations only go so far, and cannot, under the CDF's
framework, justify the facilitation of acts that defy the core
conception of the person. In this regard, if the accused murderer
confided in the lawyer an intention to commit more murders
upon acquittal, the lawyer would be hard-pressed to justify
continuing the representation. Similarly, a Catholic lawyer
asked to represent a minor seeking court permission to obtain an
abortion without her parents' consent must refuse the
representation. 29 This outright prohibition against facilitating
defiance of the moral law also undoubtedly underlies a recent
statement by the Pope in which he seems to question the moral
standing of Catholic divorce lawyers.30
29 See Bd. of Profl Responsibility of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., Formal Op. 96-F-140
(1996) (requiring Catholic lawyer to proceed with a court appointment in such a
case despite his religiously grounded objection); see also Teresa Stanton Collett,
Professional Versus Moral Duty: Accepting Appointments in Unjust Civil Cases, 32
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 640-48 (1997) (analyzing Tennessee Formal Opinion 96-F-
140 and exploring alternatives for attorneys to avoid court appointments based on
their beliefs).
30 The Pontiff cautioned that Catholic lawyers "must always decline the use of
their profession for an end that is counter to justice, like divorce." David O'Reilly,
Pope's Words Unsettle Catholic Lawyers, PHIL. INQUIRER, Feb. 3, 2002, at B05
(reporting on pope's statement to the Roman Rota); Melinda Henneberger, John
Paul Says Catholic Bar Must Refuse Divorce Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2002, at A4
("Pope John Paul II said... that civil lawyers who are Roman Catholic must refuse
to take divorce cases...."); Cindy Wockner & Amelia Kerr, Pope acts to stem
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But the limited pluralism espoused by the CDF is not simply
a template for determining the permissibility of a proposed
representation. Rather, the CDF has offered a spirited defense
of the notion that the Church's conception of the person can be
honored in divergent ways, and that there are often multiple
layers of moral truth implicated by a given set of events. For
lawyers especially, the recognition of this complexity is essential,
but it cannot justify the abdication of moral responsibility. For
example, agreeing to facilitate a landlord's eviction of low-income
tenants seems problematic given the Church's teaching
regarding the poor. At the same time, though, the Church
certainly contemplates a societal role for the economic dictates of
capitalism, as well as the defense of the landlord's property
rights. The seemingly inescapable tension between these
strands of Catholic social thought is rendered more manageable
by the CDF's insight. Focusing on the overarching dignity of the
person, rather than the dominance of one particular value or the
other, allows the Catholic lawyer to maintain some semblance of
professional and personal coherence. A lawyer with such a
mindset may decide to proceed with filing eviction papers, but
perhaps only after devoting (likely unbilled) time seeking
alternative avenues by which the tenants' housing needs could
be met.
As for the transactional lawyer mentioned at the outset of
this essay, if her corporate client proposed a deal that required
the termination of workers and took no account of the personal
hardship caused thereby, the lawyer may be obliged to raise her
concerns with the client and at least ensure that the acquisition
proceeds along one of the many paths consistent with the dignity
of the workers. Under these circumstances, a Catholic lawyer's
recognition of the moral law would not preclude economically
necessary layoffs, but would simply require that the plight of the
affected workers be considered and aided to the extent feasible.
If the client persisted on a path that did not take account of the
workers' well being, then withdrawal from the representation
may be in order.31
'plague' - Catholic lawyers asked to stop handling divorce cases, THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Jan. 30, 2002, at 9 ("Pope John Paul II has created a storm of
controversy around the globe, calling on Roman Catholic lawyers and judicial
officers to avoid working on divorce cases.").
31 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) (2002) (allowing an
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Of course, the moral law will also speak to the more
mundane methods of everyday legal practice, precluding, for
example, lying to the court or facilitating lying by her client,
taking unfair advantage of an adversary, or turning a blind eye
to suffering caused by the representation, even if extrinsic to the
attorney-client relationship.
The point of these examples is not to establish a checklist of
permissible and impermissible conduct, but simply to show that
Catholic teaching aims to shape a lawyer's conduct, not to dictate
it. Indeed, the vast majority of decisions to undertake a given
representation and how to proceed within a given representation
will not directly implicate the moral law. Even where the points
of impact are clear, the implications of that impact will not
always be clear, and conscientious Catholic lawyers will disagree
about what their moral obligations compel them to do under
particular circdmstances. Such disagreement does not somehow
render theethical inquiry superfluous, but underscores the need
for deliberate, and often communal, 32 distillation of Catholic
teaching and discernment of its professional applications.
The integration of faith and legal practice presents neither
an esoteric pipe dream nor an unending fount of debilitating
guilt. It arises from a core of moral truth that is capable of
ongoing implementation through the day-to-day decisions of the
lawyer. But it is not without cost. A heightened sensitivity to
the import of faith for the practice of law cannot be translated
purely into a sense of empowerment or entitlement on the part of
individual religious lawyers or their communities of faith. More
than most vocations, the practice of law tends to wed lawyers to
conceptions of the good that are not their own. An individual
choosing a life of faith together with a life in the law will
continue to experience significant tension in the development
and maintenance of her own identity, sense of loyalty, and
notions of professional duty. When a lawyer takes her faith
seriously, there often will be serious professional consequences.
In certain instances, a lawyer will have to make tough, costly
decisions between the dictates of the moral law, as elucidated by
attorney to withdraw from representing a client who "insists upon taking action
that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental
disagreement .... ).
32 See Vischer, supra note 28, passim (discussing communal nature of faith-
based ethical discernment in the context of Catholic lawyering).
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her faith tradition, and the demands of a client-centered
business.
But the dictates of the moral law need not be construed as
an insurmountable obstacle to a person of faith functioning ably
and faithfully as a provider of legal services within a liberal
democracy. Indeed, the CDF's message should encourage
lawyers of every faith to persist along the many potential paths
of integration between the moral law and legal practice.
Christians, in particular, are called to the legal profession, just
as they are called more broadly to "exercise their proper task of
infusing the temporal order with Christian values, all the while
respecting the nature and rightful autonomy of that order."33
The CDF emphasized that "the lay faithful are never to
relinquish their participation in 'public life', that is, in the many
different economic, social, legislative, administrative and
cultural areas, which are intended to promote organically and
institutionally the common good."34 Discerning and following the
paths of integration may not always be obvious, nor cost-free, but
it is an essential undertaking for any lawyer seeking "the unity
of Christian life: coherence between faith and life, Gospel and
culture."35
33 Doctrinal Note, supra note 6, 1.
34 Id. (quoting John Paul II, Apostolic Exhortation, Christifideles locici, 42).
35 Id. 9.
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